Bad Blood, Black Desires: On the Fragility of Whiteness in Middleton and Rowley’s *The Changeling*

This essay reads Thomas Middleton and William Rowley’s *The Changeling* (ca 1622) as a meditation on the fragility of white privilege. The anxieties about blood in the play are situated by how the English viewed Spain as the least white nation within Europe. The trope of blackness impacts the way others read Beatrice-Joanna’s sexual transgressions, ultimately questioning her chastity and challenging her privileges as a white woman. Rather than seeing whiteness as a stable identity category, I argue that the privileges of whiteness were particularly unstable for white women in the early modern period.

Two modern productions of Thomas Middleton and William Rowley’s *The Changeling* (ca 1622)¹ have used what Ayanna Thompson calls conceptual casting to make the play speak to the issue of race. For Thompson, conceptual casting is distinct from colour-blind casting, insofar as colour-blind casting asks the audience not to see the race of the actors and to focus on their performances and the characters they are embodying, while conceptual casting is a ‘model in which actors of color are cast in roles to enhance the play’s social resonance’.² A conceptual casting model does not assume that an audience is blind to race in performance, and ‘an actor’s race might be highlighted to draw parallels between the early modern and (post) modern periods’.³ In 1964, famed modernist director Elia Kazan produced an ‘ill-fated’ production of *The Changeling* at the Lincoln Center Repertory Theatre that cast a Black actor as Alonzo, a move a *New York Times* drama critic disapproved of because it ‘vilified Beatrice-Joanna beyond warrant by adding racial prejudice to her already substantial list of sins’.⁴ In 1988, Sir Richard Eyre set the play in a Spanish slave colony. While the upper-class characters were all white, De Flores’s and the lower-class characters were Black. Beatrice-Joanna’s revulsion to De Flores, thus, appeared to be based on colour

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prejudice and not an aversion to his ugliness or his skin condition. Peter Porter describes George Harris’s De Flores as ‘a noble if disadvantaged black man, twice as proud as Othello’ and that making him ‘a member of a different race is to run counter to Middleton’s point’.

What does it mean to say that a play is not about race? How do we demarcate those early modern plays that are about race and distinguish them from plays that are apparently not about race? Margo Hendricks, for example, asks us to consider why we read Antony and Cleopatra, Othello, and Titus Andronicus as plays about race, while we read plays where all the characters are white as addressing class, nationalism, or Englishness? I worry that these productions are making the all-too-common mistake of assuming that unless the play explicitly hails it, whiteness is not a racial category, or that a play is only about race if one of the characters is a person of colour. Thus, rather than highlighting the social resonance of Middleton and Rowley’s play by adding Black characters to the text, critics and theatre practitioners ought to look at how the play theorizes whiteness.

Middleton and Rowley’s play explores a significant conversion in Beatrice-Joanna that enables her to go from an innocent, pious woman, to someone willing to commit adultery and murder. When Alsemero first encounters Beatrice-Joanna outside the temple in Alicante, Spain, he is excited to speak with a wealthy and fair maiden. After flirting with Alsemero, Beatrice-Joanna experiences what she tells the audience is ‘a giddy turning’ (1.1.158) that causes her to ‘change [her] saint’ (157). For Deborah G. Burkes, Beatrice-Joanna’s turn happens because she suddenly realizes that ‘marriage could be a sexually fulfilling union’. According to J.L. Simmons, once Beatrice-Joanna considers the pleasures of marriage, she experiences a ‘loss of sexual control’ that eventually causes her infamous ‘habituation to sin’.

How might the perception that Beatrice-Joanna becomes sexually awakened and sinful relate to the idea of race? Before Beatrice-Joanna is revealed as an arsonist, murderess, and adulteress, her whiteness was unmarked. After she is discovered, her whiteness becomes visible. As whiteness scholar Richard Dyer explains, some scholars think that ‘race is something only applied to non-white peoples’ and ‘as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced’ while white people ‘are just people’. For Dyer, there is no more powerful position than being ‘just human’. According to whiteness theorist Ruth Frankenberg, whiteness is a ‘location of structural advantage’ and ‘privilege’. Those who are perceived as white gain these advantages, while those who are defined as not white do not. Thus, one of the ways that whiteness becomes visible is when we see characters lose the
structural advantages of whiteness. Alsemero, for example, declares that Beatrice-Joanna’s ‘black … deeds’ have ‘deformed’ her (5.3.63, 77). As long as Alsemero thinks Beatrice-Joanna is a wealthy, fair, and chaste maiden, he treats her with dignity and reverence because he sees her as romantically and personally valuable; once he believes that Beatrice-Joanna is morally black, he discusses her as if she is categorically inferior to him and valueless. Thus, while Beatrice-Joanna never becomes phenotypically Black, this play displays what G.K. Hunter called the early modern ‘colour prejudice’ against Blackness, or what I will call anti-Blackness.¹⁴ When she is valuable to Alsemero, Beatrice-Joanna’s race is invisible and she enjoys the structural benefits of wealthy white womanhood; once she is no longer valuable to the white men around her, her grip on those structural advantages becomes fragile.

The idea that whiteness is fragile is influenced by Robin DiAngelo’s discussion of white fragility. DiAngelo is interested in the ways white people become ‘highly fragile in conversations about race’. She notes that many white people will shut down emotionally when they encounter ‘the smallest amount of racial stress’ because it feels ‘intolerable’ to the point where ‘the mere suggestion that being white has meaning often triggers a defensive response’.¹⁵ In contrast, this paper is interested in the idea that white people have to act to maintain their privileges as white people, and that those with a more marginal relationship to whiteness have to perform more labour to maintain those privileges. Following premodern critical race scholar Geraldine Heng, I will argue that differences in blood and skin are ‘selectively essentialized as absolute and fundamental, in order to distribute positions and powers differently to human groups’.¹⁶ In this case, issues of blood and skin become absolute and fundamental in this play as tools that can be used to revoke powers and privileges from a wealthy white woman who has committed a sexual transgression. As sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois argues, racists make essential meanings and classifications based on ‘the grosser physical differences of [skin] color, hair and bone’.¹⁷ While Middleton and Rowley do not comment on bone structure in the play, they are interested in the relationship between blood, skin, and privilege.

In arguing that whiteness is fragile in Middleton and Rowley’s play, I am building on the work of premodern critical race scholars.¹⁸ I am, moreover, responding to the call of scholars like Kim F. Hall in Things of Darkness, Peter Erickson in ‘The Moment of Race in Renaissance Studies’, and Arthur Little, Jr, in Shakespeare’s Jungle Fever to deconstruct the role of whiteness in early modern texts,¹⁹ and David Sterling Brown’s request for early modern critics to consider plays about whiteness in the early modern period as plays about race.²⁰ The reason
so many premodern critical race studies scholars care about reading whiteness is best explained by Francesca T. Royster, who argues that early modern critics take whiteness ‘as a kind of default setting for human skin color’.21 As premodern critical race theorist Ian Smith argues in his seminal article ‘We Are Othello’, ‘The failure among critics to routinely remark whiteness as a fully realized racial category’ today or in the early modern period ‘enables the normative invisibility of whiteness, which is a sign of its hegemony’.22 Scholars can challenge this hegemony by learning how to talk about whiteness as an emerging racialized category in the early modern period.

Reading The Changeling in terms of whiteness, moreover, picks up on Middleton’s critique of the default assumption that white people are more virtuous than Black people. As Gary Taylor notes in Buying Whiteness, Middleton may have played an important role in the history of discussing whiteness on the early modern stage.23 His pageant, The Triumphs of Truth (1613), contains the first ‘unmistakably generic, unmistakable positive use of white in extant dramatic texts’ and the ‘the first unequivocally positive representation of a Black speaker in the entire surviving corpus of English dramatic texts’.24 For example, in the pageant, a Black Christian king addresses the audience, telling them,

I see amazement set upon the faces
Of these white people, wond’ring and strange gazes;
Is it at me? Does my complexion draw
So many Christian eyes that never saw
A king so black before? (411–15)25

Middleton schisms faith from skin colour, with a Black king suggesting to a white audience that from his perspective they are the ones who are strange; the king’s Christian faith is not impacted by his skin colour, and the play goes on to complicate the idea that phenotypically white people are inherently more moral than Black people. As Taylor notes, for Middleton, what matters is not skin colour, but ‘the boundary that separates Christians from non-Christians’.26 Implicit in this concern is that some white people ground their privilege on their supposed moral and religious superiority as Christians without being particularly Christian in the way that they interact with others. Here, I would respectfully disagree with Taylor that Middleton does not think skin colour matters. The whole point of the speech is that it would be ‘amazing’ for a white audience to see a Black king as a Christian because they are accustomed to associating Christianity with whiteness and blackness with sin, evil, and death. Middleton articulates whiteness as a tool that can hide mischiefs from suspicion, in the same way that Christopher Marlowe
suggests in *The Jew of Malta* that the appearance of Christian piety ‘hides many mischiefs from suspicion’ (1.2.281). Middleton is keen to point out that a lot of characters may look outwardly fair and virtuous, but they are inwardly black.

**Bad Blood**

To some degree, Middleton and Rowley set the play in Spain because they were picking up on the setting of their source material, John Reynolds’s moralistic and sensational *The Triumph of God’s Revenge Against Murderers* (1621). Middleton wrote or collaborated on three plays about the Spanish between 1620 and 1625: *The Changeling* (1622), *The Spanish Gypsy* (1622), and *A Game at Chess* (1624). Middleton’s Spanish phase was driven by his anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish patrons. English-Spanish hostilities existed throughout the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, but they intensified in the 1620s. According to Trudi L. Darby, by the time Middleton begins his series of Spanish plays, the nation’s political class was divided into pro- and anti-Spanish parties. The anti-Spanish party wanted to go to war with the Hapsburgs, while members of the pro-Spanish party advocated for peace. Those who harboured pro-Spanish tendencies were frequently suspected of having pro-Catholic sympathies. Middleton’s patrons came from the more militant and anti-Spanish wing of the House of Commons, who had a majority and the popular support of the people.

English racial anxieties about Spain — a country often considered to be ‘the least “European” of European nations’ — were central to this propaganda campaign. According to Barbara Fuchs, early modern Spain was diverse and hybrid; as the westernmost location in Europe, it was ‘orientalized by its European rivals in a deliberate attempt to undermine its triumphant self-construction as a Catholic nation from 1492 on’. Middleton’s Spanish plays were part of a collection of early modern sermons, pamphlets, and plays that racialized Spanish people as insufficiently Christian or white, while representing the Spanish as an existential threat to Northern European Protestantism. In this context, Beatrice-Joanna’s whiteness would have been fragile for many theatre-goers in an early modern English audience because the Spanish were considered to be not quite white.

The racialization of the Spanish was designed to argue that they did not deserve the rights and privileges typically afforded to white Christians because they did not have ‘pure’ white blood. Heng argues, discussions of race in the premodern period do not necessarily have to refer to complexion or pigmentation. According to Michael Omi and Howard Winant, racialization extends ‘racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group’. In this
way, racialization transforms blood into something unseen but that carries a sense of racial legacy, as we see in settler-colonial nations that have blood-quantum laws. Heng argues that race is a tool ‘to distribute positions and powers differentially to human groups’, and to ‘construct a hierarchy of peoples for differential treatment’.34 We make race to justify racism, or, as Ta-Nehisi Coates puts it, ‘race is the child of racism, not the father’.35

Consider, for example, Edmund Spencer’s representation of the impurity of Spanish blood in A View of the Present State of Irelande (1596); Spencer calls the Spanish ‘the most mingled, most uncertain and [the] most bastardly’ of Christian nations.36 For Spencer, the Iberian Peninsula was filled with ‘honourable people’ before it was colonized by ‘savage’ peoples, like ‘the [Moors] and Barbarians breaking over out of Africa’. In the early modern period, Spencer argues, there is ‘scarse any dropp of the olde Spanishe bloode left’.37 Spencer articulates Spain as a nation that was once white, but immigration and miscegenation have replaced the older white Spanish with non-white peoples. Spencer articulates Spanish blood as contaminated with Moorish, African, and Semitic blood, and, as such, he does not see the Spanish people as white through this selectively essentialized quality of impure blood.

The focus on ‘blood’ at the end of The Changeling, moreover, may be evoking the doctrine of Limpieza de Sangre, one of the first racist ‘blood’ laws in Europe. As David Nirenberg notes, the Iberian Peninsula was the most diverse place in Europe, and ‘The late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed massive attempts to eliminate that diversity through massacre, segregation, conversion, Inquisition, and expulsion’.38 The Spanish Inquisition distinguished Jewish and Muslim converts to Christianity, or Cristiano Nuevos, from older Christian families who were ‘Christians by nature’, or Cristianos de Natura. According to Nirenberg,

the ideological underpinnings of these new discriminations claimed explicitly to be rooted in natural realities, as is most evident in the doctrine of ‘Limpieza de Sangre’. According to this doctrine, Jewish and Muslim blood was inferior to Christian; the possession or any amount of such blood made one liable to heresy and moral corruption; therefore any descendant of Jews and Muslims, no matter how distant, should be barred from church and secular office, from any number of guilds and professions, and especially from marrying Old Christians.39

While Spanish authorities were careful to reference ‘Christian’ blood and not ‘white’ blood, the language of Old Christians gives away the idea that these laws
were about re-establishing the structural privileges of whiteness in Spain. They singled out Semitic and Arabic families for differential treatment, even if those families converted to Catholicism generations ago. If these laws were merely about faith, then there would be no reason to have forced families who were baptized as Christians to submit genealogies to prove they did not have any Jewish or Muslim ancestors. The Spanish Inquisition created a fear that any family could be discovered as Semitic, and thus that any family could be excluded based on having bad blood. The racial paranoia blood laws created is central to the anxieties about blood in the play.

According to Jerome Freedman, in early modern Spain ‘religious anti-Judaism’ became ‘racial antisemitism’ because so many Jewish families willingly converted to Christianity out of genuine faith and out of a desire to access the structural privileges and property of whiteness. As such,

sixteenth-century antisemitism was not the result of Jewish unwillingness to convert and assimilate into general society … but developed precisely because tens and hundreds of thousands of Jews had converted and were living normal Christian lives, indeed, were making an enormous Christian spiritual contribution to both Catholic and Protestant religious development.\(^40\)

Thus, ‘only a test of blood and ancestry could provide a distinction between one Christian and another now that so many Jews had converted and were no longer subject to traditional forms of repressive legislation’.\(^41\) Any Catholic family could discover that they had Cristiano Nuevos blood, and this discovery could have political, economic, and even criminal consequences. In other words, the very law that was created to solidify the property of whiteness served to make whiteness fragile, since anyone could be discovered to have bad blood in their family genealogy.

The doctrine of Limpeza de Sangre implied that Cristiano Nuevos would always be thought of as Jewish by the Spanish Inquisition, even if their families had not practiced Judaism since the 1530s, since ‘the Spanish Inquisition considered all Jewish converts true Marranos and crypto-Jews’.\(^42\) The Spanish Inquisition tracked the paternal and maternal family lines of those accused of Judaism to find out if they had any ‘Jewish’ blood in them, under the racist belief in ‘the immutability of Jewishness’.\(^43\) Thus, the doctrine of Limpeza de Sangre undermined the very idea that Jews could convert to Christianity through renouncing their old faith and being baptized in the Spirit of the Lord. Christianity and the rights and privileges of full participation in Spanish society became a matter of blood
rooted in a fear that one’s family may be exposed as insufficiently Spanish to be considered a real Christian who enjoys the privileges of whiteness. The Spanish Inquisition protected the rights and privileges of Cristianos de Natura by exposing the supposed bad blood of Cristiano Nuevos.

The privileges of blood and the power of bad blood are central themes in *The Changeling*. For example, when Beatrice-Joanna rejects De Flores’s advances, she tells him to ‘Think but upon the distance that creation / Set ‘twixt thy blood and mine, and keep thee there’ (3.4.133–4). The line is a near-perfect articulation of early modern racism. Beatrice-Joanna sees her superiority over De Flores’s blood as a product of divine order, and she expects De Flores to have internalized the idea that she is so superior to him that having an affair with her is unthinkable. We can almost hear an echo here of the ideology of the Cristianos de Natura who is assured that creation has set them apart from Cristiano Nuevos through their blood.

After the murder, De Flores deems Beatrice-Joanna ‘A woman dipped in blood’ (3.4.125). De Flores tells Beatrice-Joanna to ‘settle [herself] / In what the act has made [her]’ and ‘forget [her] parentage to [De Flores]’ (134–6). These lines bring together anxieties about blood with anxieties about the sufficiency of baptism for Christian conversion. Beatrice-Joanna is not defined, then, as a Catholic matron in this metaphor, but as a ‘fair murd’ress’ (141) because she has been baptized in blood, a substance thicker than water. After the murder, De Flores no longer considers Beatrice-Joanna to be a woman whose blood and class place her above his station. The deed has pulled her down to his level. Earlier in the play, Beatrice-Joanna observes: ‘Our eyes are sentinels unto our judgements / And should give certain judgement what they see’ (1.1.70–1). We cannot ‘see’ the corruption of Beatrice-Joanna’s blood, but we can see and be deceived by her physical beauty and fairness. As Beatrice-Joanna notes, the eyes can be deceived by ‘common things’, like the appearance of a person, and when ‘our judgments find’ out the truth about a person’s character, it can ‘then check the eyes, and call them blind’ (73–4). In this case, Beatrice-Joanna’s fairness can blind us to her potential for evil. She may still look like the fair and innocent woman that opened the play flirting outside the temple (1), but she has become something ‘darker’ through her rebaptism in blood.

Beatrice-Joanna, moreover, wonders if she was born with bad blood and if this is the cause of the hardships she is now enduring. De Flores tells her he will ‘blast the hopes and joys of marriage’ for Beatrice-Joanna and ‘confess all’ because he rates his life ‘at nothing’ (3.4.148–9). She must sleep with De Flores or risk
exposure as a murderess. (To be clear, what De Flores is doing is entrapment and rape, as I will discuss in more detail below.)

Beatrice-Joanna says,

\begin{verbatim}
Vengeance begins;
Murder I see is followed by more sins.
Was my creation in the womb so cursed
It must engender with a viper first?
\end{verbatim}

Saying that Beatrice-Joanna’s mother’s womb is cursed evokes the perception that her inferior biology contributed to her condition. In other words, Beatrice-Joanna is not articulating this as a conversion to evil through her baptism in blood, but as something that was inherently biologically evil about her being expressed when given the opportunity. Indeed, one of the more sinister implications of internalized racism is that people who do evil things can see their actions as caused by their biology rather than taking responsibility for their actions. While Beatrice-Joanna is not clearly entertaining the possibility that her mother may have been Semitic, we should pay attention to the fact we first encounter her not outside of a church, as we get in Reynolds’s original story, but outside of a temple, a term that could refer to a place of worship for Jews, Muslims, or Christians.

Beatrice-Joanna uses the logic of race when realizing that she has become evil. As Irving Ribner says, the play is ‘concerned not so much with the degeneration of Beatrice-Joanna … as with her coming … to recognize and accept the evil which has always been a part of her’. Beatrice-Joanna is seeing the fragility that Peggy McIntosh calls the ‘uneearned strength and unearned power conferred [by] privilege’ given to her ‘by birth [and] luck’. What we have to remember is that unearned power and strength are fragile, and thus anyone who can make you doubt you had the right to feel them in the first place can take them away. After the murder, De Flores suggests that Beatrice-Joanna is ‘the deed’s creature’ who has ‘lost [her] first condition’ (3.4.136–8). If her father’s blood, wealth, and status represent who she was, De Flores argues that she is now a woman who has been ‘turn’d … out’ by ‘peace and innocency’ and ‘made … one with [him]’ (139–40). Her good breeding may have led her to feel superior to him before the murder, but now she sees herself as debased, not because of what she did (as De Flores suggests) but because of her changing understanding of her fragile privileges.

Beatrice-Joanna’s final speech returns to the relationship between blood and dignity, with the strong implication that she needs to be excluded because of her bad blood. Beatrice-Joanna tells her father:
Oh, come not near me, sir; I shall defile you.  
I am that of your blood was taken from you  
For your better health; look not more upon’t,  
But cast it to the ground regardlessly.  

(5.3.149–52)

Beatrice-Joanna speaks as if her abject blood makes her an object of disgust. Her death is like a bloodletting. She is a willing sacrifice who allows herself to be cast out to preserve the purity of the ‘blood’ of her family. Interestingly, in this case, the blood comes ‘from’ Vermandero and not Beatrice-Joanna’s mother, implying that whatever evil was in his blood was passed on to Beatrice-Joanna, and thus that her death is essential to his long-term health and well-being. Beatrice-Joanna functions as a scapegoat who is so ashamed of herself that she volunteers to be sacrificed. According to René Girard, one of the functions of a scapegoat is to indicate ‘both the innocence of the victim, the collective polarization in opposition to them, and the collective end result of that polarization’. Scapegoating creates an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. The innocence of the included is ensured by placing the blame for what has happened on something strategically essentialized about the excluded. In other words, if Beatrice-Joanna can be excluded because she inherited bad blood from her mother and perhaps her father, then her death removes the ‘tainted’ blood from the family and ensures the future health and social position of the family.

After being exposed as a murderess and adulteress while her family and friends watch her once privileged blood spill all over the stage, Beatrice-Joanna says it is ‘time to die, when ’tis a shame to live’ (5.3.179). One of the more sinister elements of biological racism is that it makes those who have internalized the idea that something is biologically and ontologically wrong with them feel like continuing to exist is shameful. Likewise, part of the point of the Spanish Inquisition was to make Cristiano Nuevos internalize the idea that there was something shameful about their continued existence within a white Christian state. Beatrice-Joanna’s discussion of blood thus requires a self-racialization. If whiteness is the state of being unmarked, Beatrice-Joanna’s tainted blood is marked, even if we, as an audience, cannot see it. That marked blood has racial and moral meaning to her. Her lament reflects the internalization of the ideology of Limpeza de Sangre and reminds us that this play may be about white characters, but it directly addresses the issue of race through its oblique discussion of the fragility of white (Christian) privilege within the context of the Spanish Inquisition.
Black Desires

Act 5, scene 3 of Middleton and Rowley’s *The Changeling* explores and justifies the fragility of the power of white women in early modern culture. According to Michael Neill, *The Changeling* can be read as a rewriting of William Shakespeare’s *Othello*, insofar as it ‘recombines elements of its model to create a disturbing sense of simultaneous familiarity and strangeness’. An important difference between the plays, for Neill, is that *The Changeling* replaces the racial anxieties created by Othello’s and Desdemona’s relationship with class anxieties created by Beatrice-Joanna’s and De Flores’s relationship. Both plays are interested in the agency of the desired white woman who becomes undesirable because of rumours about her chastity. While Desdemona dies as a martyr, Beatrice-Joanna dies as a scapegoat. Thus, while I agree with Neill that the play does not address interracial desire in the way Shakespeare’s *Othello* does, and that Othello’s Blackness is replaced with De Flores’s anxieties around his class and status, I think *The Changeling* is about race insofar as it explores the relative fragility of Beatrice-Joanna’s white privilege. Indeed, a key to understanding Beatrice-Joanna’s fall in this play is to consider how she begins first to doubt if she deserves her privileges because of her potentially bad blood, and then the way she is excluded from her community due to her blackness.

De Flores’s whiteness matters because it implies that he has a sense of inwardness. Critics have noted the surprising psychological modernity of *The Changeling*. As Nora Williams argues, Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores establish their psychology through the ‘liberal use of asides’ that ‘allow [them] to articulate thoughts and feelings to the audience that [they] might wish to conceal from other characters on the stage’. The ability to hide one’s intentions depends on what Katharine Eisaman Maus calls inwardness or ‘the difference between an unexpressed interior and a theatricalized exterior’. For Maus, ‘Persons and things inwardly are’ while ‘persons and things outwardly only seem’. Such distinctions are typically made to privilege ‘a person’s thoughts and passions, imagines as properties of the hidden interior’ that are ‘not immediately accessible to other people’. As Smith argues, ‘Inwardness is the province of whiteness’ on the early modern stage. White villains have the privilege of drawing a strict separation between their inside and their outside, what Smith calls a sense of ‘privileged white consciousness and subjectivity’. Beatrice-Joanna’s schemes depend on people assuming she is innocent because of how she looks, and De Flores’s ability to have so much access to Beatrice-Joanna depends on people assuming that a respectable white man would not rape a young white woman if given the
opportunity. As Smith notes, the ability to appear innocent allows ‘fraudulence to flourish’ by enabling ‘a [person] to appear to be one thing and yet be quite another’.\textsuperscript{57} Black men on the early modern stage are never afforded the privilege of looking innocent. Looking innocent is a structural privilege of characters with white skin. This privilege, however, is relative and not absolute. Black characters are always already under scrutiny as potentially evil or immoral because Blackness is associated with an ‘absence of consciousness [or] soul’.\textsuperscript{58} Appearing innocent is what McIntosh would call a privilege of whiteness, an unearned advantage that comes with looking innocent in a culture that associates sin, death, and guilt with Blackness.\textsuperscript{59} 

\textit{The Changeling} explores the prejudices attached to skin colour and skin health, drawing a relationship between skin condition and social caste.\textsuperscript{60} Both Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores have white skin privilege. De Flores’s white skin privilege is fragile because of his poor complexion. De Flores is a white man with a reputation for being honest and honourable. He uses his whiteness and reputation to buy himself access to Vermandero’s service, which in turn affords him multiple opportunities to stalk his daughter. Peter Womack, moreover, argues that De Flores is ‘Positioned outside the play’s respectable society by his ugliness and his menial status’.\textsuperscript{61} In this way, De Flores’s poor skin functions as what Smith calls a ‘chromodermal signifier’, insofar as the play asks audiences to make prejudgments about De Flores’s moral character based on the physical appearance of his skin.\textsuperscript{62} In this way, what matters more to audiences: that he is a white man with a reputation for honour, or that he is an ugly man with a clear obsession with an unmarried young woman who is clearly not attracted to him physically? Not to put too fine a point on it, but if De Flores were Black and ugly, it would be highly unlikely that anyone would have let his behaviour towards his master’s daughter pass, as they would have assumed his black skin was a signifier of his potential for sexual transgression. As the play is, his scarred skin literally marks him as a villain, both in the sense of being a lower born person and in the sense of being an unprincipled antagonist. As De Flores puts the issue, Beatrice-Joanna is ‘The cruellest enemy to [his] face in town’ and that she cannot ‘abide the sight of [him] / As if danger of ill luck hung in [his] looks’ (2.1.34–6). Rather than getting the audience to think critically about the assumption that ugly men are a danger to beautiful women, the play reinforces this normative logic, implying that Beatrice-Joanna was right to fear the look and destructive sexual potential of a man whose name evokes the idea of deflowering. In this way, the play has a lot in common with early modern plays about white women having transgressive sex across the colour line that results in death or exile.\textsuperscript{63} Beatrice-Joanna becomes
engaged in what J.L. Simons calls a ‘sexual nightmare’ that is ‘both horrible and fascinating’ when she crosses the ugliness line. Beatrice-Joanna calls De Flores an ‘ominous’ and ‘ill-faced fellow’ who ‘more disturbs [her] / Than all [her] other passions’ (52–3). Whenever Beatrice-Joanna sees De Flores’s skin, she thinks ‘of some harm towards [her]’ (89–90). The sight of De Flores’s skin bothers her so much that she hopes to find her father in a ‘good mood’ so that she can get his servant ‘discarded’ (92–3).

Beatrice-Joanna says that De Flores’s skin is revolting, yet she represses her disgust and touches his ‘hard face’ (2.2.88) as part of a ploy to convince him to murder Alsemero. She takes a queer pleasure in touching his face, as a way of asserting her erotic power over him. Beatrice-Joanna says:

Why, [say] I loathed him
As much as youth and beauty hates a sepulchre,
Must I needs show it? Cannot I keep that secret,
And serve my turn upon him? (66–9)

While touching De Flores’s skin, Beatrice-Joanna says, ‘When we are used / To a hard face, [it is] not so unpleasing’ (87–8). She says to De Flores that ‘hardness becomes the visage of a man well’ because it ‘argues service, resolution, manhood’ (92–3). According to Patricia Cahill, this moment fashions the touching of diseased skin as an object of inquiry, reinforcing the sense that touch is as ‘enigmatic as it is powerful’. The danger of erotic games is that the skin can have a logic of its own, and while one may be revolted by the appearance of someone they are touching, that very revulsion can add an intensity to the touch that can be perversely pleasurable. The scene explores the ‘waywardness of the sense of touch’, and it challenges ‘the notion of individual agency’ by showing ‘that skins have a way of going awry on their own’. When Beatrice-Joanna touches De Flores’s diseased face, ‘forcing herself to do it, fighting down her revulsion’ she experiences ‘a state of violent responsiveness’ with an erotic ‘intensity’ that overwhelms her loathing.

De Flores understands that Beatrice-Joanna is disgusted by his skin condition, but he does not care because sexual passion exists ‘beyond all reason’ (2.1.84). He imagines that a woman as youthful and beautiful as Beatrice-Joanna could dote on his face because some women are ‘odd feeders’ who take pleasure in ‘Slovenly dishes, and feed heartily on ’em’ (2.2.153, 151). The question of the play is a sexual slippery slope. If a woman can overcome her revulsion to touch the face of an ugly man below her station, then what will stop her from sleeping with that man; once she has slept with an ugly man, what will stop her from sleeping with any man?
As De Flores grossly puts the issue, if a woman will ‘fly from one point, from him she makes a husband’ then she may ‘spreads and mounts then like arithmetic — / One, ten, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand’ (61, 62–63). His logic here is a version of Othello’s claim that he must sacrifice Desdemona or ‘she’ll betray more men’ (5.2.6).69

Beatrice-Joanna’s fairness can also be read as a marker of caste and racial status. Hall argues that ‘Christianity has long provided the Western world with a symbolic order in which good, purity, and Christianity itself are associated with light and whiteness, while evil, sexuality, and difference are linked with darkness’.70 As Joyce Green MacDonald notes of white women on the early modern stage, one of the white skin privileges they can depend on is being read as ‘morally sensitive, sexually pure, and fitted by nature to preside over the domestic and maternal’.71

Beatrice-Joanna loses her reputation for sexual purity by having sex outside of wedlock with an ugly man. As Celia R. Caputi (formerly Daileader) argues, many early modern plays ‘justify a woman’s death on the basis of her sexuality — even, very often, on the basis of one single (if singular) sex act’, such that white women in the early modern period were frequently literally or symbolically killed for having sex with the wrong men.72 Moreover, as Katherine Gillen reminds us in *Chaste Value*, the idea of women’s chastity was ‘a symbol of political stability’ and something exchangeable between a father and a husband in the marriage ritual ‘both as an attribute belonging to a woman and as the possession of a man’.73 Chastity, thus, like whiteness, is a form of property, and only women who are thought of as chaste are valuable to their husbands. Beatrice-Joanna, moreover, was willing to pay De Flores not to rape her, telling him on her knees that she will make him ‘master / Of all the wealth I have in gold and jewels’ if he will ‘let [her] go poor unto [her] bed with honour’ (3.4.156–8). These lines remind me of Ruth Kelso’s dictum in *Doctrine for the Lady of the Renaissance*: ‘let a woman have chastity, she has it all. Let her lack chastity and she has nothing’.74 As Valerie Traub memorably rejoins to Kelso’s axiom: ‘let her lack chastity, she is nothing. To be a woman in [early modern] drama means to embody a sexuality that often finds its ultimate expression in death’.75

In reading Beatrice-Joanna as a woman who loses her white skin privileges by sleeping with an ugly man, I am not necessarily reading her as a victim, although I do think her death reinforces structural systems within white patriarchy in the early modern period that promoted murdering white women who were sexually transgressive as acts of erotic terrorism designed to scare other white women into being faithful to their white husbands. As Frances E. Dolan notes, Beatrice-Joanna is a ‘powerful agent’, who ‘hires a killer to bump off her fiancé, has sex with
the assassin to reward and silence him, hires her maidservant Diaphanta as her proxy virgin, and then cooks up the scheme of murdering Diaphanta as well’. According to Jennifer Panek, moreover, Beatrice-Joanna is not a helpless victim of circumstance; she could have broken off the engagement to Alonzo without murdering her fiancé, but doing so would have forced her to confess her desires to her father. For Panek, Beatrice-Joanna’s ‘decision to have Alonzo murdered is itself at least partly rooted in maintaining the persona of desireless virgin purity by which she defines herself’. What I think Neill’s, Dolan’s, and Panek’s readings miss is that Beatrice-Joanna’s power and agency are dependent on her retaining her privileges as a white woman. Retaining her reputation as chaste is what the theologian and critical race theorist Thandeka would call the ‘pound of flesh’ that Beatrice-Joanna must pay to maintain her unearned privileges. Whiteness, Thandeka argues, is paid for through actions that compel people to perform and maintain their status within their families, churches, and communities, like laughing at a racist joke while in all white company or agreeing not to discuss race or call out racism in all white spaces. As an example of this behaviour, she encouraged her students to go around introducing themselves and their friends as white. Many of the students reported shame in calling their friends and colleagues white, while others reported that the social stigma of calling another white person ‘white’ was too much for them and they simply could not carry out the experiment. What her students learned is that maintaining the privileges of whiteness comes with a cost, especially for women, LGBTQ* people, those with disabilities, and those who came from communities that are considered only marginally ‘white’. Thandeka argues that sometimes whiteness is ‘not a matter of racist conviction but a matter of survival, not a privilege but a penalty: the pound of flesh extracted for the right to be excluded from the excluded’. For Thandeka, those who will not pay this penalty can find themselves excluded from social, political, and familial networks that they depend on to survive. Thus, for many white people, saying nothing about race and racism to maintain the fragile privileges of whiteness is safer than saying something and risking social exclusion from friend and kinship networks. In this way, as long as Beatrice-Joanna is seen as a virtuous, fair, white woman, she is a powerful agent within the world of the play who can get men to do many of the things she wants. Once those men no longer see her as virtuous, her agency disappears. Thus, her agency is dependent on her reputation of chastity, and its value is racialized in the play.

Beatrice-Joanna’s infidelity humiliated Alsemero, and he is willing to use physical violence (incarceration) and psychological violence (calling her a whore) to regain control. Alsemero’s demonstrates his ‘deep suspicion’ (5.3.3) and need
for proof that his wife is unfaithful to him through his desire to use a potion to
tell if his wife is ‘a maid or not’ (4.1.41), a test she passes with an ingenious plot
and some inventive acting. Alsemero is encouraged in his doubts by his friend
Jasperino, who is worried that Beatrice-Joanna is ‘Full of corruption’ and is hav-
ing an affair (5.3.11). When Beatrice-Joanna laughs at Alsemero’s ‘broad question’
(21) asking if she is ‘honest’ (20), he says ‘that’s not a modest answer, my lady. / 
Do you laugh? My doubts are strong upon me’ (22–3). Alsemero’s assertion has a
sharp edge. Earlier in the play, she tells the audience that she cannot venture into
Alsemero’s bed after being raped by De Flores ‘without … shame, which may
grow up to danger’ since her husband, if he knew of her rape, ‘cannot but in jus-
tice strangle [her] / As [she] lie[s] by him’ (4.1.13–15). Beatrice-Joanna articulates
Alsemero — a man she supposedly loves — as helpless but to strangle her justly
because she was raped, and that the only way she can avoid this torturous fate is
to hide her rape from him. In other words, she knows that the cost of shaming her
husband in a misogynistic culture is risking her own ‘justified’ death.

Beatrice-Joanna’s assumption that her husband will strangle her reminds me
of analytic feminist philosopher Kate Manne’s Down Girl, and her argument that
strangulation is a prevalent form of intimate partner violence and torture that
often foreshadows masculine murderous intent. Manne contends that strangu-
lation is akin to waterboarding ‘both in how it feels — painful, terrifying —
and its subsequent social meaning’. Strangling a woman is ‘a demonstration
of authority and domination’ designed to silence victims. In this way, Manne
argues that we should not think of misogyny as something individual men do
because they have a deep psychological hatred of women, but as a ‘systemic social
phenomenon’ of hostile reactions women face from men who are trying to get
them to forcefully comply with gendered expectations. Beatrice-Joanna internal-
izes a form of misogyny that attempts to control her unruly black desires. Misogynistic violence is a tool to control women. We can read men who react
to the real or perceived transgressions of women against them through physical
or psychological violence as seizing the narrative by controlling and mandating
concurrence with their gendered expectations of how women should act, feel, and
behave towards them. Alsemero, moreover, uses physical and psychological ter-
torism to debase and dominate his wife as a way of getting over his shame that she
has ‘cheated’ on him with an ugly man she has ‘rancorous loathing’ for (5.3.50).
Alsemero does not seem to care if this sexual encounter was consensual or not.
What matters is his shame and rage, and his need to punish Beatrice-Joanna for
making him feel this way.
Once Alsemero is sure that Beatrice-Joanna has been ‘unfaithful’ to him, he assumes that she will go to hell for her transgressions. Indeed, the idea of hell is a tool of misogyny in a Christian framework, as it implies a misogynistic God who will punish women for being unchaste with eternal tortures. Thus, when Beatrice-Joanna asks Alsemero for forgiveness, he calls her a ‘crying crocodile’ (5.3.112) because he does not take her repentance to be sincere, and he tells her to prepare for demonic tortures:

I’ll be your pander now; rehearse again
Your scene of lust, that you may be perfect
When you shall come to act it to the black audience
Where howls and garnishing shall be music to you. (114–17)

A pander can be a go-between for clandestine love, like Cassio was for Desdemona and Othello, but it can also be ‘A person who assists the immoral urges or evil designs of others’.85 Alsemero will assist Beatrice-Joanna by imprisoning her and hastening her damnation. He tells Beatrice-Joanna that she will be his ‘prisoner only’ and that she must enter his ‘closet’ where he will be her ‘keeper’ (86–7). After questioning De Flores, who gladly confesses to the murder plot and who further debases a woman he raped by calling her promiscuous (107), Alsemero places Beatrice-Joanna in the closet with her rapist, since they are ‘twins of mischief’ (142). One of the most controversial lines in the play is Beatrice-Johanna’s ‘Oh, oh, oh!’ from within the closet with De Flores (137). What is happening in the closet is unclear. Are they having consensual, or non-consensual, sex? Is De Flores stabbing Beatrice-Joanna as part of a murder-suicide? What is clear is that the men on the stage are interested in the ‘horrid sounds’ coming from the closet (141), but they are not interested in investigating what happened to Beatrice-Joanna in the closet before she dies. Since she is now a ‘black’ woman, the white men on the stage might not make a distinction between her being raped by De Flores and her having sex with De Flores.86

The play ends with an emphasis on the blackness, and thus damnation, of Beatrice-Joanna’s soul after death. After the murder-suicide, Tomazo calls Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores ‘black fugitives that are fled from thence’ (5.3.193). While they are phenotypically white, their souls are black in the sense that they are sinful for their murders, their adultery, and their deaths. The sense here is similar to Hamlet’s desire to kills Claudius when ‘his soul may be as damned and black / As hell, whereto it goes’ (3.4.99–100),87 and Aaron’s acknowledgment that he has a ‘black soul’ to match his Black face (3.1.208).88 A black soul is one that is stained by sin and will end up tormented for eternity in black hell.
A white soul, in contrast, is one that is unstained by sin and thus will spend eternity in heaven. Their sin is exposed, and Beatrice-Joanna is ‘fit and seasoned for [her] passage’ to hell (3.4.91). At the end of the play, the fair Beatrice-Joanna and the ugly De Flores have their inner blackness exposed. Beatrice-Joanna, a rape victim, believes that her ‘honour’ has fallen (5.3.158). Her last words are to ask for forgiveness, not from God who might still save her soul, but from the men watching her who have judged her as black, saying that it is ‘time to die, when ’tis a shame to live’ (179). Her story ends, then, with the realization that she would rather die a painful death than live with the shame of being a dishonourable, unchaste, Black woman. Without the privileges of a good reputation, she no longer sees life as worth living.

In closing, then, my reading of Beatrice-Joanna’s loss of privilege has been intersectional in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s use of the term. While intersectionality is primarily a tool Black feminists use to understand how classism, racism, and gender discrimination can overlap, making Black women vulnerable to multiple types of discrimination, it can also be a tool that we can use to map the ways that multiple forms of privilege can make white people feel invulnerable to discrimination. As McIntosh argues, white people are often able to count on multiple, intersecting, forms of privilege. Those privileges, however, are not absolute. The privileges of white women within a male-dominated society are always provisional. White women are white so long as they think of themselves as white culturally or biologically and they are read as white by other white people in general, and by white men in particular. If whiteness is a kind of property, then it is vulnerable to white men taking it away from women. While losing one element of privilege does not make a white woman black, when white women like Beatrice-Joanna begin to doubt their rights to the privileges they have and the men around them begin to doubt if they are worthy of those privileges, then their whiteness can become fragile.
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3 Ibid, 78.
17 Du Bois concedes to scientific racists that there are wide differences in things like skin colour, hair texture, language, and cranial measurements between the races, but, no matter how different races may appear to be, he follows Charles Darwin in arguing that ‘their likenesses are greater’ and thus there is a ‘scientific doctrine of Human Brotherhood’. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Conservation of Races* (District of Columbia, 1987), 5.
24 Ibid, 127.
29 Ibid, 146.
34 Heng, *Invention of Race*, 3
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Jerome Friedman, ‘Jewish Conversion, The Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reforma-
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, 5–6.


49 Ibid, 95.


51 Williams, “‘Cannot I keep that secret?’”, 31.


53 Ibid, 5.

54 Ibid, 4.


56 Ibid, 34.

57 Ibid, 33.

58 Ibid, 34.

59 Peggy McIntosh, ‘White Privilege’, 112.

60 In using the term ‘caste’ this way, I am influenced by Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist and author Isabel Wilkerson, who argues that American racism is entrenched and supported by a rigid and difficult to change caste system. Wilkerson argues that ‘A caste system is an artificial construction, a fixed and embedded ranking of human value that sets the presumed supremacy of one group against the presumed inferiority of other groups on the basis of ancestry and often immutable traits, traits that would be neutral in the abstract but are ascribed life-and-death meaning in a hierarchy favoring the dominant caste whose forbears designed it’. She continues, ‘I do not see a reading of caste as being in tension with a reading of race any more than I would see a reading of gender or class being in tension with race. Caste systems can have overlapping systems of demarcation between those who are higher caste and those who are on the bottom’. Isabel Wilkerson, *Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents* (New York, 2020), 17.
63 The diseased state of De Flores’s skin juxtaposes with the healthy and youthful quality of Beatrice-Joanna’s skin, in the same way that Othello’s Blackness is contrasted with Desdemona’s “alabaster” hyper-whiteness (5.2.5). One of the themes *The Changeling* picks up from *Othello* is the relationship between women’s desire and fear. Brabantio does not think it likely that Desdemona was wooed by Othello because she would not ‘fall in love with what she feared to look on!’ (1.3.115). Desdemona overcomes this aversion to Othello’s Blackness because of his abilities as a storyteller, the ‘witchcraft’ that he uses to woo Desdemona (1.3.195).
64 Simmons, ‘Diabolical Realism in Middleton and Rowley’s *The Changeling*’, 138–9.
65 Cahill, ‘The Play of Skin in *The Changeling*’, 397.
66 Ibid, 393.
67 Ibid.
68 Womack, ‘New Directions: Embodied Theatre in *The Changeling*’, 112.
73 Katherine Gillen, *Chaste Value: Economic Crisis, Female Chastity and the Production of Social Difference on Shakespeare’s Stage* (Edinburgh, 2017), 5, https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474417716.001.0001.
78 My reading of Thandeka is influenced by Francesca T. Royster’s article on whiteness in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*, where she uses Thandeka to argue that membership in ‘the white community is never unconditional: white group identity is enforced by the threat of exile and fundamental shame. Each individual must learn to be white, must choose whiteness, and must accept white privilege’. See Royster, ‘White-Limed Walls’, 436.
81 Ibid, 11.
82 Ibid, 13.
83 Ibid, 21.
84 Thus, for Manne, ‘We should think of misogyny as serving to uphold patriarchal order, understood as one strand among various similar systems of domination (including racism, xenophobia, classism, ageing, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, and so on). Misogyny does this by visiting hostile or adverse social consequences on a certain (more or less circumscribed) class of girls or women to enforce and police social norms that are gendered either in theory (i.e., content) or in practice (i.e., norm enforcement mechanisms)’. Fear of being strangled for being raped is a classic example of the adverse social consequences used to enforce gendered expectations about women’s sexual behaviour. Manne, *Down Girl*, 13.
85 *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, s.v. ‘Panderer’.
86 As Angela Davis reminds us, in her book *Women, Race & Class* (New York, 1983), underlying the assumption that ‘Black men harbour irresistible and animal-like sexual urges’ is the idea that all Black people are ‘invested with bestiality’ (182). For Davis, moreover, this leads to the idea that Black women are sexually promiscuous, causing their accusations of sexual abuse to ‘lack legitimacy’ in the eyes of a white justice system (182). While Beatrice-Joanna is not a Black woman, men around her view her as black, which means that the men around her would most likely not believe nor care if she said that she did not want to have sex with De Flores. After all, this is a play where De Flores says that he ‘won’ Beatrice-Joanna’s ‘honour’s prize’ (5.3.168) as a reward for murdering Piracquo, and the play focuses more on his ‘pleasure’ (5.3.168) than it does on the physical and emotional pain De Flores’s rape caused Beatrice-Joanna. To see this pain, the men in the play would have to see Beatrice-Joanna as a woman who did not deserve to be raped, who was not asking for it. These men, however, would be unlikely to extend such dignity to a woman they have defined as Black.
89 Crenshaw uses the image of an ‘intersection’ to get at the ways Black women experience discrimination as a result of their subject position between multiple systems
of domination, arguing that, ‘Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars travelling from any number of directions, and sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination’. Likewise, the fragility of privilege is like how a lane of an intersection can become suddenly and surprisingly uncontrolled, leading a person who thought it was safe to cross the road to be suddenly hit by a form of discrimination that they never expected to harm them. Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics’, University of Chicago Legal Forum 140 (1989), 149, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429500480-5.

90 My phrasing here is influenced by Crystal M. Fleming’s How to Be Less Stupid About Race: On Racism, White Supremacy, and the Racial Divide (Boston, 2018), 64–5.

91 McIntosh, ‘White Privilege’, 110–12. Here, moreover, I would note that McIntosh cites the Combahee River Collective Statement of 1977 and the idea that it is ‘hard to disentangle aspects of unearned advantage which rest more on social class, economic class, race, religion, sex and ethnic identity’ (113). Thus, one could argue that McIntosh’s feminist reading of white privilege shows us that the field was intersectional in its foundation. For more on this, see ‘The Combahee River Collective Statement’, in Available Means: An Anthology of Women’s Rhetoric(s), ed. Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald (Pittsburgh, 2001), 291–300, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5hjqnj.